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A B S T R A C T
The emergence of medium-scale farms is having important consequences for agri-
cultural commercialisation across Africa. This article examines the role of
medium-scale A farms allocated following Zimbabwe’s land reform after .
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While the existing literature focuses on changing farm size distributions, this article
investigates processes of social differentiation across medium-scale farms, based on
qualitative-quantitative studies in two contrasting sites (Mvurwi andMasvingo-Gutu).
Diverse processes of accumulation are identified across commercial, aspiring and
struggling farmers, and linked to contrasting patterns of agricultural production
and sale, asset ownership, employment and finance. The ability to mobilise
finance, influenced by the state of the macro-economy, as well as forms of political
patronage, is identified as a crucial driver. Contrary to assertions that A farms are
largely occupied by ‘cronies’ and that they are unproductive and under-utilised, a
more differentiated picture emerges, with important implications for policy and
the wider politics of Zimbabwe’s countryside following land reform.
Keywords: Medium-scale farms; commercial agriculture; land reform; Zimbabwe.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Across Africa, the size structure of farms is changing, with an increasing propor-
tion of medium-scale farms (Jayne et al. ). This is having profound implica-
tions for the patterns of agrarian accumulation and the possibilities of
commercialisation. In Ghana and Zambia, for example, medium-scale farms
now account for more land area than small-scale farms, defined as cultivating
under five hectares (Sitko & Chamberlin ; Jayne et al. ).
Land concentration in medium-scale farms, under new ownership and land
tenure arrangements, occurs through different routes – either through accumu-
lation of land by those who earlier had smaller plots via local land markets, or
acquisition of land by ‘outsiders’ through political and other connections. In
Zimbabwe, the emergence of a medium-scale farm sector is linked to land
reform after , which created around , additional medium-scale
farms (ranging in size from c.  ha to over a thousand hectares, averaging
 ha). These land reform resettlement farms (denoted A) account for
. million hectares, nearly % of the area of all agricultural landholdings
(Moyo : ).
This paper explores the origins and implications of these medium-scale farms
in Zimbabwe, asking how they fit into the post-land reform agrarian structure,
who the owners are, what they produce and sell and how they are differentiated.
As a now major, but poorly understood, part of the agricultural economy, the
aim is evaluate the A farm experience against the wider story of the rise of
medium-scale farms in Africa more broadly, examining in particular the pro-
cesses of differentiation among such farms, and so the diverse trajectories of
change observed.
Farm size distributions in agrarian economies matter, as they influence
overall patterns of inequality, the opportunities for accumulation and the poten-
tial linkage effects between farm sectors in regional economies (Sitko & Jayne
). Agrarian structure also often reflects rural political settlements, with
different agrarian classes linked to farms of different sizes (Moyo ;
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Scoones ). In former settler economies, land reforms have been focused
on overturning a highly unequal land distribution, creating new opportunities
for both smallholders and ‘emergent’ commercial farmers.
In Zimbabwe, land reform was aimed at transforming the former dualistic
structure, creating a ‘tri-modal’ structure (Moyo & Chambati ). This
involves small-scale farms, including communal areas, as well as old and new
(A) resettlement areas (total . million farms, over . million ha),
medium-scale farms (A farms, plus older small-scale commercial farming
areas, total , farms, over . million ha) and large commercial farms
and estates (total , farms, over . million ha) (Moyo : ).
Medium-scale farms are crucial in this new agrarian structure. They are
neither small-scale, often subsistence-oriented peasant farms, nor are they
large-scale, highly capitalised farms and estates, sometimes owned by multi-
national capital. Previously, black-owned, medium-scale farms were created as
‘Purchase Areas’ from the s (Cheater ), but the extent was limited.
Today, medium-scale farms in Zimbabwe, as defined by the A ‘model’, are
mostly sufficiently large that they offer the opportunities for commercialised
agriculture, involving mechanisation, the employment of a permanent work-
force, the use of high levels of ‘modern’ inputs and the generation of substantial
market offtake. All this requires capitalisation and regular flows of finance, as
well as considerable skill in both production and marketing. Of intermediate
scale, embedded in regions where smallholder farming dominates, they take
on a new role in regional economies, potentially offering support for equipment
sharing, labour employment and market assistance.
This is the theory at least and was the driving inspiration behind Zimbabwe’s
resettlement planning from the s. This paper explores the practice, nearly
 years after the land reform of , asking whether such medium-scale farms
offer a vision of the future of commercial agriculture, as some claim based on
studies elsewhere in Africa, or whether in fact there are more diverse trajectories
of change emerging, with some succeeding, while others struggle.
S T U D Y A R E A A N D M E T H O D S
This study was undertaken in Mvurwi, a high-potential area to the north of
Harare, and Gutu and Masvingo districts in Masvingo province, in the drier
south-east of the country. The study focused exclusively on those farms desig-
nated as A during the ‘fast-track’ land reform programme. The study therefore
does not adopt the size classifications used in other recent studies of medium-
scale farms, which rather arbitrarily designate medium-scale to be any farm
above five hectares and below  hectares (e.g. Jayne et al. ). Nor does
it include farms that are medium-scale operations, such as those designated as
self-contained A (smallholder) farms or former ‘Purchase Areas’ (Scoones
et al. a).
In each of the study regions, a full list of A farms was compiled. This had to
rely on a variety of sources, given the sensitivity of the data. A government audit
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of all A farms undertaken in  was also used, along with data held by the
then ministries of land and agriculture. We also cross-checked these listings
with farmers, extension officers and government officials in the field. There
has been a large turnover in A areas, with take-overs, inheritances and subdivi-
sions affecting farm owner listings, making establishing a sampling frame espe-
cially challenging.
From these comprehensive listings, we collected basic census data for all
farms, including date of settlement, farm size, main farm activities and
former/current non-farm occupations. The listings were then used to draw a
random sample in each site. In the end, the sample was  farms in Mvurwi
(% of A farms in the area), reduced because of drop-outs, and  across
the Masvingo-Gutu sites (% of farms). Our sample was broadly representative
of the wider population, in terms of land area, focal activities and occupations of
the farm owners, as indicated by an analysis of census results. A random sample,
however, presented problems for data collection given the dispersed geography
of the farms and the frequent absence of farm owners, and the survey took a
long time to implement. A short questionnaire survey, combined with in-
depth interviews with owners/managers/workers, was conducted with all
sampled cases. In both sites, the sample overlapped with earlier surveys under-
taken in –, allowing some limited analysis across time.
A preliminary stratification into three categories was generated, based on the
survey data. Sample households were ranked according to the average of maize
and tobacco (for Mvurwi only) output for the – seasons, as well as cattle
ownership in . These variables were chosen following discussions with
farmers, who confirmed that these were the most significant factors that differ-
entiated farms. A composite ranking was created and then the full listing was
divided into three, as there were no obvious breaks in the data distributions.
While a simple division into three equal groups means that the distinctions
between the bottom of one group and the top of the next are not significant,
the overall categorisation correlated well with a range of other variables (relat-
ing to income, marketing, asset ownership and other indicators of agricultural
commercialisation; see Tables I–IV), even though the distribution of values
overlap, as indicated by often wide ranges. The broad correlation between indi-
cators gave us confidence in this initial categorisation, and so the stratification of
the survey data. However, to gain a deeper insight into processes of differenti-
ation and accumulation, the farmer categorisation and the associated survey
results must be taken together with the other more qualitative data from particu-
lar cases, which were collected through interviews in each site.
As we discuss below, while there are broad trends and tendencies highlighted
by the three farmer categories, there are other cases that are outliers. For
example, some who engage in particular ‘projects’, may generate significant
income, say from broiler production, but may not be ranked highly in relation
to crop income and cattle ownership. The advantage of a small sample size of
course is that we know each of the cases well, and the story that emerges
below – including the identification of ‘projects’, such as broiler production,
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TA B L E I
Profiles of A farmers
Mvurwi Masvingo-Gutu
   Overall    Overall
Sample size (N)        
Age of household head Late s Around  Early s Around  Late-s Late-s Mid-s Mid-to-late s
Educational qualification (completed secondary) % % % % % % % %
Agricultural qualification % % % % % % % %
Female headed % % % % % % % %
Based on farm % % % % % % % %
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as a key commercialisation strategy – derives from a triangulation of insights,
with the three categories only being a useful starting point. To complement
the survey and case study interviews, we therefore conducted  more detailed
follow-up interviews with farmers and farmworkers selected purposively in both
sites and across the three categories, focusing on farm and household biograph-
ies, and so changes over time.
In addition to our core sample, we also undertook seven studies of joint-
venture A farms in Mvurwi; these included farms operated both by Chinese
companies and those managed by displaced white farmers. As discussed later,
a simple classification of ‘commercial’, ‘aspiring’ and ‘struggling’ farmers
emerged through an interpretation of the data. While broadly centred on the
three categories derived from our survey data, the classification takes into
account other factors. It focuses less on the static patterns of agricultural
output and asset ownership, but more on the dynamics of change, linked to
ongoing processes of social differentiation, accumulation and class formation,
in turn offering insights on the emergent politics in Zimbabwe’s post-land
reform countryside as influenced by medium-scale A farms.
A N E W A G R A R I A N S T R U C T U R E : W H O A R E T H E M E D I U M - S C A L E
F A R M E R S ?
The A model was proposed as part of the  land policy, with land allocated
mostly during –, as part of the ‘fast-track’ land reform programme. The
new farm structure reflected a commitment to supporting commercial agriculture
outside remaining large-scale farms and estates. Allocations of medium-scale farms
represented a political class compromise by the party-state to help satisfy land
demands from the middle class (mostly professionals, including many civil ser-
vants) and party-military-business elites (members of the security forces, as well
as business-people and ruling party officials). While land demands of mostly
poorer people involved in land invasions were met under the A scheme, the
A resettlement areas targeted a different group (Moyo & Chambati ).
T A B L E I I
Previous/current occupations of farm owners
Farmer categories (%)
Mvurwi Masvingo-Gutu
   Overall    Overall
Communal area farmer        
Farmworker        
Urban employed        
Civil servant        
Security services        
Self-employed businessperson        
Other        
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TA B L E I I I
Asset ownership patterns (average, with standard deviations in parentheses)
Mvurwi Masvingo-Gutu
Farmer categories      
Land area (ha) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.)
Area cropped (ha) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.)
Cattle (N)  ()  ()  ()  ()  ()  ()
Goats (N)  ()  ()  ()  ()  ()  ()
Tractors (% of households)      
Cars (%)      
Trucks (%)      
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TA B L E I V
Patterns of production and farm employment (average, with standard deviations in parentheses)
Mvurwi Masvingo-Gutu
Farmer categories      
Mean annual maize output – (kg) , (,) , (,) , (,) , (,)  ()  ()
Mean annual maize sales – (kg) , (,) , (,) , (,)  (,)  ()  ()
Maize fertiliser – (kg) , (,)  ()  ()  ()  ()  ()
Mean annual tobacco sales – (kg) , (,)  ()  - - -
Cattle sales (% of households)      
Irrigation (%)      
Horticulture sales (%)      
Pigs (%)      
Broilers (%)      
Permanent employees (N) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.)
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One frequently heard narrative about land reform in Zimbabwe is that it was
captured by ‘cronies’, with allegedly over half the land taken by ZANU-PF
officials. However, such claims are disputed, as research shows how the A
smallholder resettlement areas were largely occupied by landless/land-poor
peasants from nearby communal areas and un/underemployed people from
urban areas (Moyo et al. ; Scoones et al. ; Matondi ). Within
the A medium-scale farm areas, there is a mixed population, which includes
well-connected elites, but nowhere near to the extent claimed.
Officially, applicants for A farms had to present a business plan and show
they had the necessary experience and sufficient capital before allocation.
However, political factors did intervene and this technocratic allocation
process could be overridden through influence on provincial and district
land committees (Marongwe ). Subsequent to initial allocations, rearran-
gements were sometimes forced, particularly around election times, with this
rising to a peak before the contested elections of , when political favours
were granted and scores settled. Those with significant influence – notably gov-
ernment ministers and high-ranking military officers – were also able to break
the land-ceiling regulations and the ban on multiple holdings. However, as
our data show, these instances were rare. War veterans were notionally given
preferential access, with % of farms supposedly reserved for them
(Matondi : ). However, most only managed to gain access to A farms,
as they helped lead invasions, and it was usually only war veteran association
leaders and officials who were allocated A plots.
The result is a diverse population on the A farms, as we explore below. How
does this match up to the pattern seen elsewhere in Africa? Studies from Ghana,
Kenya, Nigeria, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia (Sitko & Chamberlin ;
Anseeuw et al. ; Jayne et al. ; Hall et al. ; Muyanga et al. ),
for example, show that medium-scale farms emerge both through land consoli-
dation in an area, as locals buy out smaller farmers, and through the purchase of
blocks of land from outside. This is sometimes combined with state-directed
redistribution, and assistance with settlement. Those occupying such farms
include both active and retired civil servants, investing salaries and pensions
in farms; businesspeople, with urban enterprises, but a desire to extend com-
mercial activities to agriculture; as well as councillors, chiefs, politicians and
others with connections. Patronage politics and processes of ‘accumulation
from above’ are common (Mamdani ), and such farms represent the
fast-changing political and commercial interests in agriculture across Africa
(Morris et al. ).
How does this compare with A medium-scale farms in Zimbabwe? Table I
offers profiles of the farmers in our sample, comparing the two sites. It shows
that household heads are mostly men and relatively old, more so in Mvurwi
where the average age was around . The younger average age of the farm
owners in Masvingo-Gutu reflects a process of inheritance since settlement, as
many original occupants have died and farms have been passed on to sons
and wives, indicated by the higher proportions of female-head owners. Most
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farm owners had completed secondary education, and over half in Mvurwi had
completed an agricultural qualification (concentrated in category  house-
holds), including ‘Master Farmer’ certificates and agricultural diplomas, espe-
cially among those previously working as extension agents. Some had
university degrees, even one MSc in agricultural economics. Others also had
specific tobacco-related qualifications, gained at the nearby Blackfordby
College. The lower level of agricultural qualification in Masvingo-Gutu
reflects the turnover in household heads, as sons and wives of the original
owners had not pursued such courses, even if the original owner had gained
access to the land on the back of such qualifications.
The patterns of residence are quite different. In Mvurwi, over two-thirds of
household heads were based on the farm (all of those in category ), even
though nearly three-quarters also had houses in town (usually Harare, 
km away), especially those in category . This relates to the intensity of produc-
tion (often of tobacco) and the need for regular, on-site supervision. This
pattern has changed since , as farmers have retired from jobs, and
moved to engage in farming. Many realised that ‘cell-phone’ farming does
not necessarily deliver. In Masvingo-Gutu, by contrast, only a third are based
on their farms full-time, although this rises to just over a half among category
 farmers. Partly this is due to the lack of infrastructure in many of the
Masvingo-Gutu farming areas, making it difficult to settle for families used to
the relative of comforts of town life. It also relates to the nature of production
in low-potential agro-ecological regions, with many operating extensive cattle
ranches, which require less supervision and so the possibilities of managing
the farm through weekend visits.
Table II indicates the previous/current occupations of A farmers across the
sites. The narrative that these farms were captured by ‘cronies’ is not supported.
That said, those in the ‘security services’ category, including those employed by
the police, army and Central Intelligence Organisation, were often able to
manipulate the application process and gain access to land. Those with jobs,
current or past, in the security services were more common in Mvurwi
(% compared with %), which is closer to Harare and has more desirable
land. Civil servants were especially common in Masvingo-Gutu, concentrated
in category , and included many teachers/headmasters, health professionals,
agricultural extension officers, veterinarians and others, including those
working in local government. Some of these individuals were able to manipulate
the system too, especially if they also had a political position, but many simply
applied and met the criteria.
Those defined as urban employed were the dominant category in Mvurwi,
again especially concentrated in category , and included those cutting across
a range of jobs outside the civil service. This again reflects the proximity of
the site to Harare, where those jobs are more common. Most had applied
through the formal routes, demonstrating a business plan and a level of
capital available. Jobs included those in private sector companies, NGOs, char-
ities and churches. Again, some were able to influence allocations through
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political connections, but this was very much the minority. Those defined as self-
employed business people were present in both sites, and include those working
locally, frequently in nearby towns, often in transport firms, restaurants/bars
and retail shops. In addition, there were a few former farmworkers in both
sites, who, having been displaced from farms by the land invasions in ,
applied for land; perhaps surprisingly all within category , possibly reflecting
their high skills at farming and so higher output.
Finally, there were politicians. There were no serving politicians in our
random samples, but there were cases within the whole population, including
several retired ministers, one now late Vice-President and some MPs, current
and past, as well as a few with political posts in the ruling party. All these, we
suspect, gained land outside the formal application procedure. Political
favours do not necessarily last, however, and there were several cases where
high-ranking figures were removed in both sites. Data on political party affilia-
tion cannot be collected because of sensitivities, but most resettlement areas,
as with the rural areas of the country in general, have consistently voted for
ZANU-PF. That said, there are plenty of opposition supporters in these areas
too, who will ‘perform’ being ruling party members to avoid retribution
(Mkodzongi ).
Across these groups, % and % identified as war veterans in Mvurwi and
Masvingo-Gutu respectively. This category is a flexible one, and includes many
who were war collaborators, rather than liberation war fighters. However, the
data show the continuing influence of the ‘war veteran’ identity in political pro-
cesses in Zimbabwe. War veterans appear across all occupation groups, except
for farmworkers. Since demobilisation after Independence, they have taken
up diverse jobs, many returning to farming in their original communal areas.
In sum, the A farms are populated by a hugely diverse group of people, with
different identities, occupations and affiliations. While certainly existing, so-
called cronyism does not dominate, and the population is the result of a com-
bination of allocation processes: some formal and technocratic, others based
on political position and patronage. As already discussed, the overall compos-
ition is actually very similar to that recorded in the other studies of medium-
scale farms elsewhere in Africa.
In class terms, we observe an influential, but numerically relatively small,
group of business-political-military elites, combined with a much larger profes-
sional middle class (often former and current civil servants), together with
urban-based, well-networked business people, and some former peasant
farmers from communal areas and a few former farmworkers. People’s iden-
tities are complicated by political affiliations, historical associations with the lib-
eration war and also regional and local alliances, including with influential
churches. For example, in the wider census in Masvingo-Gutu, there were five
farmers who were officials of the ruling party-aligned Apostolic Faith Mission
church, including a bishop and several pastors.
However, to understand the class dynamics emerging in the A areas, we
cannot rely on these simple assignations of occupation or affiliation; indeed,
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class formation and emerging relations are highly dynamic, and have changed
significantly over the last  years. Therefore, in the next sections, we focus on
processes of accumulation and differentiation across farms, and ask the key
questions of critical agrarian studies, following Bernstein (): who owns
what, who does what, who gets what and what do they do with it?
S E T T L E M E N T A N D B U I L D I N G A S S E T S F O R A G R I C U L T U R E
Most farmers in our sample got allocated land in . The A allocations fol-
lowed on from the land invasions, which subsequently became A resettlement
schemes. The sub-division of large farms into A plots involved more planning,
as attempts were made to distribute land and farm assets in ways that a single
operational farm could emerge. There were disputes over who got what, with
some rejecting their allocations, while others contested allocations of farm-
houses and other desirable assets. In Mvurwi area, the issue of control over
and responsibility for farm labour compounds was contentious, with some wel-
coming access to labour from a nearby compound, often housing several
hundred former farm worker families, while others mentioned in interviews
that the presence of such populations was a liability, blaming them for thefts,
disruption and refusing to work. It was a turbulent period, and initially little
farming was carried out.
Even when disputes cooled off and new patterns of labour hiring and control
were negotiated, establishing a farm required considerable investment of time,
money and skill. With land audits always on the horizon, assuring occupancy
and some level of activity was always important. This sometimes meant the
placing of a few workers or relatives to hold the farm, while resources were mobi-
lised. For those who gained farms with previously cultivated land, it was possible
to move into production relatively quickly; for others it was more challenging.
For tobacco, Chinese finance through contracting arrangements was essential
(Mukwereza ). For those establishing livestock operations, acquiring or
moving stock was the first step, often starting with small herds and flocks.
The studies in these sites from the mid-s showed that, with a few excep-
tions, the A farms were performing extremely poorly, with extensive under-util-
isation of land and limited production (Moyo et al. ; Scoones et al. ;
Matondi ). Unlike for the smallholder A settlements, getting started
without capital and with limited external support was challenging. While
there were various schemes, initiated through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,
these were ad hoc and notoriously corrupt, making accessing equipment,
cattle or finance difficult for many (Shonhe ). From around 
inflation accelerated, rising to a peak in , after which the economy was dol-
larised. The hyperinflationary period disrupted investment plans and, while
some were able to exploit the parallel currency arrangements through black
market deals, most suffered through losses of money value. Production, which
by then was beginning to get going, collapsed. It was only during the period
from , coinciding with the Government of National Unity and a period
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of relative stability, that things picked up again. This period was when some
people were able to accumulate and the pattern of differentiation seen today
emerged. With inflation rising and an economic crisis engulfing the country
once again from , the threats to investment in the A farms are high, poten-
tially undermining the gains made.
What is the pattern of asset ownership seen across the three farmer categories
identified from the survey data according to ranked crop output and cattle own-
ership? Table III offers a snapshot from –, showing clear trends across
the categories, but also large variations within. Land holdings are lower in
high-potential Mvurwi than lower-potential Masvingo-Gutu, but vary signifi-
cantly. There is high variation in land utilisation, where only those in the top cat-
egory are cropping significant areas. Tractor ownership is surprisingly low given
the areas cropped by the top farmer categories, but there is a vibrant rental
market in the A areas. Cattle holdings are unsurprisingly much higher in
Masvingo-Gutu, but those in the bottom category have very few on average.
The same applies to categories  and  in Mvurwi, and it is only those in the
top group who have a commercial herd (above ). Goats are not common
in any site, and relatively few are kept as a household flock. In terms of other
equipment, at least one car or truck is owned by % of households in
Mvurwi and by % of households in Masvingo-Gutu. The long distances to
town and the lack of any other transport make having vehicles crucial, and
many category  farmers have invested in small five-tonne trucks. With electri-
city being so unreliable, many have also bought generators, which power
homes as well as small-scale irrigation operations.
P A T T E R N S O F P R O D U C T I O N A N D E M P L O Y M E N T
How does asset ownership translate into agricultural production and income?
As Table IV shows, the difference between the top category and the others is
stark. With some exceptions, it is mostly those in category  who have the
resources and external finance to crop significant areas, although the ranges
of production/sales levels are large. The top farmer category is the only
group who employ significant numbers of permanent employees (at least in
Mvurwi to run tobacco operations), and they are most likely to employ a farm
manager to oversee the farm. They also have the greatest number of pig and
broiler projects, although these are relatively few in number. Horticultural pro-
duction is again most common among category  farmers, although most are
trying some at varying scales. Irrigation facilities are unevenly distributed, and
it is category  that has the highest proportion in both sites. Access to irrigation
partly depends on inherited installations; although, as time has passed, many
farmers, especially in Mvurwi, have invested in boreholes, pumps, pipes and
generators.
The pattern of differentiation observed reflects a divergence in strategies
amongst A farmers. Those who are able to raise finance from different
sources are able to invest and make profits from maize and tobacco production.
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Production among the more commercially oriented farmers is increasingly
mechanised. For example, land preparation in  was by tractors in %
of farms in Masvingo-Gutu and % in Mvurwi, much of it through rental/
borrowing arrangements. From small beginnings, Mrs M explains how she is
slowly building a commercial operation:
When we came here there was nothing. Just tall grass. We had to build houses, dig
boreholes. My late husband was a farm manager. He wanted to farm. We came with
two head of cattle, one plough and the clothes we were wearing. We had two young
kids at that time. It was tough. The first year we grew only maize and beans on a small
plot. Today we plough seven hectares (of a total farm size of  ha), and have ten
cattle. I don’t have a tractor, but hire, and also use my own oxen. This last year I har-
vested four tonnes of maize from three hectares, retaining several tonnes to feed the
family and pay labour. I also planted . ha of sweet potatoes, selling  buckets,
together with groundnuts ( buckets) and Bambara nuts ( buckets) at the road-
side. My son is now  years old and is married. He works together with me, but also
brings in money from a taxi service he runs using a car we bought from our farming.
I rent out three hectares and get paid in fertiliser. I also sell gum poles from the
plantation to pay for labour from the nearby compound. I want to expand
further, especially in horticulture if I can get another borehole.
Alternative strategies involve intensification of production through investment
in irrigation for commercial horticulture. With markets locally, as well as
through contracts with supermarkets, hospitals and boarding schools, this is
an option favoured by many, as it is easier and less risky than crop production.
However, as many noted, there are today multiple challenges arising from the
variable supply of fuel or electricity for generators and pumps, and this is
hitting aspiring horticultural farmers hard. Mr M from Gutu explained:
I am a retired teacher and got the farm in  through an application. I only
started farming in , and initially focused on maize. The maximum we got was
 tonnes. This year it was little because of drought. We do not live on the farm,
but it’s near and go most days. These days, I am concentrating on pig farming
and horticulture. I irrigate one hectare of vegetables. I get orders from hotels, res-
taurants and shops from as far as Kwekwe and Harare. One of my sons works in a
hotel and purchases vegetables, and also invests in the garden project.
Projects, including pig farming, aquaculture and broiler production, require
limited land areas, but significant funds. Across our cases, there were multiple
cases, usually involving investment from sons and daughters of farm owners
through remittances, very often from the diaspora.
Levels and styles of employment also differentiate sites and categories of
farmers. In Mvurwi, labour compounds provide a ready pool of labour, which
can be hired on a piecework basis, via intermediaries. Temporary hiring is
common in Mvurwi among all categories of farmer, where % of male tempor-
ary workers and % of female temporary workers are recruited from the com-
pounds. However, those living in the compounds, in order to survive, are also
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diversifying their livelihoods, and many have acquired small plots of land, and so
have partially withdrawn from the labour market (Scoones et al. ), making
labour recruitment more challenging.
Some, however, prefer to hire permanent labour. The highest level of per-
manent employment was  in Masvingo-Gutu and  in Mvurwi, while
maximum temporary employment was  and  respectively. Those with
skilled farm managers, and with a well-remunerated labour force, are
profiting, but some offer poor, exploitative conditions and labour unrest is
common. Most however have a hybrid arrangement, with a few permanent
employees, often guards and housemaids, and rely on temporary employment
for agricultural labour, hired on a seasonal basis. Mr C explained:
There is a large compound near our farm. In the beginning, I hired some of the
workers of the former farmer, and in those days we produced a lot of tobacco. Up
to  tonnes. This allowed me to buy tractors, cars, motorbikes and cattle. But
later I failed to keep up with salary payments. It was a tough time when inflation
hit. I now hire temporary workers from the compound. They are often unreliable
though. Last season I produced  tonnes of maize, and I have  broilers and
 indigenous chickens. It’s difficult farming here. The workers from the com-
pound frequently steal from the farm. The transformer was stolen, and we now
cannot irrigate the citrus.
Wage employment is much less common in Masvingo-Gutu given the different
pattern of extensive livestock production. Here, with farm owners often absent,
there are farm managers, guards and herders employed, and often a different
trajectory of accumulation centred on cattle production.
F I N A N C I N G A G R I C U L T U R E
Access to finance is perhaps the key factor affecting commercial agriculture on
the A farms. As discussed already, economic conditions since  have not
been favourable, especially between  and  and again since .
Lack of financing for agriculture contrasts with the situation before
Independence, when large-scale commercial farming was heavily subsidised
and received generous soft finance through seasonal and medium-term bank
loans. This was essential for both the establishment of white commercial agricul-
ture at the beginning of the twentieth century and for its sustenance thereafter
(Dunlop ; Palmer ). While state subsidies were progressively with-
drawn after Independence, there were effective subsidies operating through
preferential trade deals and continued generous financing from commercial
banks. This has not been available to the A farmers over the last  years.
In the absence of this level of support, how have A farmers fared? Table V
offers an overview of the different financing options observed in –.
Many farmers make use of a variety of options. With the exception of category
 farmers in Mvurwi, bank loans and credit were accessed by under a third of
farmers. This contrasts very unfavourably with the previous era. This relates in
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part to the liquidity crisis in the country and the preference of banks to loan
outside the agricultural sector. It also links to the collateral requirements of
banks. While all farmers in our sample had ‘offer letters’ from the state, only
four had leases; and even those with leases have been refused credit because
of ongoing disputes around the lease terms. Without having their land to
offer as collateral, some have mortgaged houses or business properties in
town, but this is not available to everyone.
Instead, many in Mvurwi have gone into contract arrangements for the pro-
duction of tobacco with private companies. This is most common among cat-
egory  farmers, who do not have the independent resources of category 
farmers, but can afford the risk of a contract arrangement unlike category 
farmers (Scoones et al. b). Sixteen tobacco contracting companies were
operating in Mvruwi area in , offering seed/seedlings, fertiliser and fuel,
as well as technical support and guaranteed markets. Many of those with their
own resources prefer to farm independently than sell through contract arrange-
ments, as they get a better price on the merchant auction floors. However, as a
way of securing stable financing and a route to accumulation, contracting
tobacco production is important for others.
Command agriculture is a government-financing scheme, supported by the
military and the current president. It offers subsidised inputs, including seed
and fertiliser, and is focused on maize production in A farms in the higher
potential areas, particularly those with irrigation (Mazwi et al. ). Access to
the scheme, at least to timely provision of the full package of inputs, is often
reliant on having the right patronage networks. Nevertheless, this has been
an important source of financing for some in Mvurwi in particular.
Some, however, can go it alone, or at least combine independent resources with
institutionally derived financing. Remittances, from both local sources and the dias-
pora, are especially important. In both sites, but particularly in Masvingo-Gutu, A
farmers also have businesses that help finance agriculture, including shops, bars,
transportbusinesses andhouse rentals. Investment in shopsand transport is essential
in areas in the land reform areas where formerly there was no transport or market
infrastructure. Over the last decade, particularly in the period when the economy
stabilised, farmers have invested farm profits in real estate, often in booming small
towns such as Mvurwi, so generating rental income (Scoones & Murimbarimba
). Formany, though, self-financing of agriculture fromagricultural production
surpluses is the most common route. Profits from one crop can be invested in the
next, and particularly the paying of labour and the purchase of fertiliser. Others
choose to sell some cattle to finance the purchase of inputs and payment of
labour, while others rely on maize to pay labour. Those growing tobacco may
choose to make arrangements with workers for payment at the end of the season
or to pay through allocation of pieces of land or bales of tobacco. This is a slow
route to accumulation and holding onto cash across a season in the absence of an
effective banking system, and with periods of high/hyperinflation, is challenging.
Finally, there are those who prefer to let others finance and run the farm.
We undertook a focused study of the seven joint-venture arrangements in
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Mvurwi to complement the randomly sampled survey. Joint ventures involve
foreign or local private investors who invest in A farmers jointly with the
land beneficiary or sub-lease whole or sections of the farms and share
profits annually after the marketing of farm produce. These joint ventures
arise either through choice, recognising that they have neither the resources
nor skills to run the farm, or out of necessity, as banks reclaim the farm due to
outstanding loan repayments. In Mvurwi, there are several former white
farmers who sub-lease farm sections, while Chinese investors in tobacco are
operating four farms as joint ventures. These involve significant external
investment in building infrastructure and covering operating costs. For
instance, a Chinese firm from Szechuan has leased a farm with  ha of
arable land north of Mvurwi. An annual lease payment is made of a fixed
amount over a -year period, and the owner has no role in the operation.
One of the Chinese managers explained:
All but  ha is under pivot irrigation. We grow tobacco intensively. We have
invested in a new ‘rocket barn’, and sell to different companies, depending on
the type of tobacco. We have bought all new equipment – generators, irrigation,
tractors, pivots. Perhaps a million US dollars. We suffered a major hailstorm last
season, but still managed . tonnes per hectare. We also have a cattle-fattening
project, but it’s just getting going. Yes, we manage a compound here, and employ
around , mostly on a temporary basis. It’s difficult to do business in
Zimbabwe – we have a consultant who used to be in the tobacco business, who
helps us, but it’s a challenge here.
In sum, A farmers, and their joint-venture counterparts, have found it difficult
to finance farming since land reform. They use a variety of routes, but all have
their downsides. The problems become exacerbated with the fragility of the
macro-economy, notably the lack of liquidity, the intransigence of the
banking sector to use leases/permits as collateral, the shortages of physical
cash, the wildly fluctuating parallel currency rates and the bouts of high
inflation. The controlled and changing tobacco pricing structure where
farmers are paid only % in US dollars, with the balance being paid in local
currency using the official exchange rate, also lowers their earnings. Our data
T A B L E V
Financing options
Mvurwi Masvingo-Gutu
Farmer categories      
Credit/loan (% of households)      
Contracting (%)      
Command (%)      
Remittances (%)      
Business income (%)      
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show how different people navigate such complexity and so gain access to
finance. Mr M from Mvurwi explained the challenges he has faced:
I started the farm when I was still in my (agricultural extension) job, but I couldn’t
farm and work at the same time, so committed to farming. We harvested lots of
maize – several hundred tonnes per year! Then inflation hit, and we suffered. I had
to sell my cars, and  cattle, which I had accumulated from farming. Since dollarisa-
tion things improved, but I have not been able to get finance from the banks. I haven’t
got access to command agriculture. In my view it’s designed for looting! I cannot
finance  hectares from my own pocket. This year, we planted only one hectare of
maize, and concentrated on sugar beans (sold on contract to boarding schools)
and sweet potatoes (bought by traders from Mbare in Harare). Next year, I will
scale down and look for joint ventures or sub-letting arrangements.
Access to finance therefore substantially underpins the variations in outcomes
in terms of production, agricultural investment and household accumulation
from agriculture. Those in category  are unable to move beyond effectively sub-
sistence production; those in category  aspire to step up to more independent
commercial production and often make use of contract farming to do so; but it
is only those in category  who really offer an example of ‘successful’ medium-
scale farming, although many struggle too.
P A T T E R N S O F D I F F E R E N T I A T I O N A N D A C C U M U L A T I O N
Locating our understanding of medium-scale farms in a relational and dynamic
understanding of agrarian change is essential. We have asked ‘who owns what?’,
through an assessment of assets owned, and have explored ‘who does what?’ in
terms of differentiated livelihoods. The key remaining questions now are ‘who
gets what?’ and ‘what do they do with it?’, requiring an exploration of how pat-
terns of accumulation result in differentiated livelihood pathways.
In particular, we must ask how on-farm and own-business profits are translated
into farm-based ‘accumulation from below’ (Neocosmos ), whereby a posi-
tive cycle of investment and asset building results in the growth of farm income
and employment (Cousins ). An exploration of the opposite trend is also
important. If on-farm or business profits are limited, through lack of finance, scar-
city of labour, limited assets and lack of markets, then how do people construct
their livelihoods? For example, how is social reproduction squeezed due to the
deployment of family labour, particularly that of women and children?What alter-
native income-earning options are sought? What relations of labour emerge, as
people engage in employment, including with richer farmers, to survive? And
cutting through all these processes, what is the role of the state – and networks
of patronage associated with the party-state – in supporting some trajectories of
accumulation, while preventing others?
In the analysis above we have contrasted three categories of farmer, derived
through a ranked ordering of indicators of crop output and cattle asset
holding. As we have shown, these in turn relate to a range of other variables
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that influence how people make a living. While recognising that there are large
ranges, overlaps between categories, significant outliers and particular cases,
how can we make sense of the emerging differentiation in A farms?
Mapping broadly, but not exclusively, onto our three farmer categories, we
suggest a simple typology below, focusing now less on static outputs and
assets, but more on the processes of social differentiation and accumulation.
This in turn can inform our understanding of the emerging dynamics of class
formation in these areas, and so rural political dynamics.
Commercial farmers
First, there are what might conventionally be designated commercial farmers.
They are producing substantial quantities of agricultural outputs, selling large
proportions and making profits. They are, in turn, investing on the farm,
whether in farm equipment or infrastructure, as well as ploughing back funds
to purchase inputs and build up assets, including livestock. They are employing
others in significant numbers, including having a permanent workforce, and
very often a professional farm manager. In other words, such farmers,
centred broadly, although not exclusively so, on category  farmers described
above, are ‘stepping up’ (Dorward et al. ), accumulating from farm produc-
tion, even if this is co-financed.
There are two routes to accumulation for such farmers. One is ‘from below’,
from own-farm production, combined with other businesses, where investment
from profits moves between different enterprises in a portfolio. External finance
may be important, but this involves paying loans and interest, as part of a busi-
ness plan. The other route to an upward dynamic of accumulation is through
involvement in patronage networks, including access to ‘command agriculture’
subsidies for around % of category  farmers. The net effect is the same –
often an outwardly highly successful commercial operation, but accumulation
is both ‘from above’ as well as ‘from below’. The first trajectory is the ideal-
type commercial farmer: independent, hard-working, business-oriented and
profitable. As we have seen, these exist but they are rare, and all are finding it
difficult to run farm businesses. The other trajectory is one that is reliant on sub-
sidies, soft loans and close connections with the state. This is of course another
classic route to commercial agriculture, given the nature of farm support the
world over; and indeed was the way settler agriculture was nurtured in
Zimbabwe throughout the colonial era (Hanlon et al. ). Most farmers in
this category show a combination of these trajectories – demonstrating effective
business management and generating their own profit, but also being reliant on
external support of different sorts.
The joint ventures discussed earlier do not fit easily into either of these pat-
terns. These are certainly ‘commercial’ farms, although questions must be
raised about the timeframe for generating profit streams. They are, however,
less embedded in the A areas, and rather an external model is transplanted,
with a very separate system of management and business practice, linked, in
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the case of the Chinese investors, to a large, sometimes global, portfolio of diverse
operations. They certainly have an impact on the local agrarian economy, as they
sell to the same markets, employ from the same labour pool and make use of the
same natural resources, but the ‘farm owners’, while profiting from the arrange-
ment, are set apart from those engaging directly in agriculture.
Commercial farmers, of the sort described here, are more common inMvurwi
than in Masvingo-Gutu, but breaking into this group is hard given the economic
conditions constraining the first accumulation trajectory and the closed nature
of political networks constraining the second.
Aspiring farmers
There are also what we call ‘aspiring farmers’; those who would like to be com-
mercial farmers, but are constrained by lack of finance and face challenges of
production and investment. These farms, centred on category  explored
earlier, are not reaching their potential, either as tobacco/maize farms in
Mvurwi or as livestock ranches in Masvingo-Gutu, and many have limited
areas cultivated and large under-grazed areas. There is sporadic investment
and some basic assets, such as tractors and irrigation equipment, but these
may be in a state of disrepair. They are largely not employers of much perman-
ent labour and rely on temporary employment. For many, the role of external
jobs and partnership connections is less evident, and they rely more on their
own, often limited, production. However, although they are ranked lower in
terms of crop outputs and livestock ownership, they are aspiring to improve,
and deploy a variety of strategies to do so.
Two trajectories of (constrained) accumulation are evident in this group.
These include those who attract family members to come and stay on the
farm, and share assets, labour and management of often quite large properties.
This we call the ‘villagisation’ strategy; something seen over generations in the
former ‘Purchase Areas’ (Scoones et al. a). As Mr C explained, this is now
beginning to emerge on the A farms, as sons establish homes and join their
now ageing parents:
Four of my sons are resident here, three are married. I have two wives, each with five
children. The farm is essential for our family. We have nearly  hectares of arable
land in a  ha farm. Normally we cultivate the full arable area. Everyone works on
their own plot, and all my sons have a tobacco grower number. I came from the com-
munal areas in , when my family was young. We had  cattle, one scotch cart
and two ploughs. I applied through the normal route, as I had a Master Farmer cer-
tificate from Chiweshe. Today we have  cattle, a truck, a trailer and much other
farm equipment. We had a tractor, but sold it to raise capital, and now hire. We all
have contracts for tobacco, and this year sold seven tonnes (less than before, as
prices are so low). Together, we also produced  tonnes of maize. We hire temporary
labour from the compound nearby, but rely on family labour a lot. I also make money
from transporting tobacco with my truck, and sell vegetables and ‘road runner’ chick-
ens. I don’t receive any external finance: everything is from the farm.
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Another trajectory also involves other family members, but through investment
in ‘projects’ from outside. Sons and daughters working elsewhere, very often
abroad, invest in particular ‘projects’, whether a pig unit, broiler production,
fish farming, an orchard or a focused agricultural project, such as chilli produc-
tion. The relative covers the costs through remittances, while residents, often
ageing parents and workers, manage the project. Mr D, a worker, highlighted
the importance of such projects:
This farm is quite large (over  ha), but we don’t do much cropping (just four
ha), and there are only five cattle. We produce maize just for the home and the
workers. The main business is pig production. We have several hundred in well-con-
structed sheds. We sell perhaps  per month, mostly to restaurants in nearby
Masvingo. A more recent project is fish farming, and we have six ponds now con-
structed, and sell bream. The farm is looked after by myself and two other perman-
ent workers, and I have been here for eight years. The owner lives in Masvingo town,
and gets support from her children who are living in different countries, including
the UK.
Both these strategies act to mobilise finance and/or labour in different ways and
help such otherwise constrained but aspiring farmers to improve livelihoods,
and begin to accumulate. Such aspiring farmers must rely primarily on kin rela-
tions to support production and accumulation. As they are less well-connected
politically, they are not big beneficiaries of state subsidies and loans, nor do they
have the connections to broker joint-venture arrangements, although, as they
explain, they would certainly like both.
Across our sample, aspiring farmers are perhaps the most common group.
Some are tentatively ‘stepping up’, others are ‘stepping out’ and diversifying,
while others are simply ‘hanging in’. For them, economic, social and political
constraints faced in Zimbabwe seriously limit potentials.
Struggling farmers
Finally, there are those whom we call struggling farmers. They are simply
‘hanging in’, if not ‘dropping out’. On these farms, broadly centred on cat-
egory , there is frequently little happening. There are few farm assets,
limited production and the farm is occupied often by an elderly person; some-
times the owner, but often a relative, perhaps together with some workers.
This may be due to a mix of misfortune, age or ill-health, and this befalls
both young and old farmers. Quite a few war veterans are in this group, as
they came with few physical assets, relying on their political capital to gain
access to land. Many are of an age when ill-health and infirmity strike, and
some have abandoned the farms, returning to communal areas or seeking
plots in A schemes, where the social fabric of a farming community is
more evident. Mrs M explained:
I come from a family of war veterans. I fought in the war, and was later a school
teacher. I got the farm in , but came in  with little – a scotch cart, a
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harrow and a plough. I bought cattle when here, and now there are . I have  ha
arable on a  ha farm, but I cannot farm much. Last year I farmed a few hectares,
but started too late. I slipped a disc and couldn’t work. I live alone here, with a
worker and survive off my pension, renting my house in Harare and help from
my son. Last year he paid for tractor ploughing. He also helps with a chicken
project, and I sell in Harare. Right now, he’s not interested in farming, and is
working in town as a lawyer for a bank. He wanted to join the ‘command’ pro-
gramme, but failed. I hope he will take over, as there’s now a good house and lots
of potential.
Overall, there are struggling farmers of very different types. There are also those
whose farms are not producing and are being held for the future, as part of an
investment for the next generations, for retirement or as speculation. This
group has a very different social profile to those who have fallen on hard
times and are struggling. They are absent from the farm, leaving workers or rela-
tives to give the impression of occupation, and may be involved in jobs or busi-
nesses in town, or even abroad. They have sufficient political connections to
retain the land in the face of an audit inspection, but are not using these to
leverage investment.
C O N C L U S I O N S
What then does this analysis mean for the future of medium-scale farms in
Zimbabwe? Over nearly  years, a process of differentiation has emerged
in the A areas, as it has in the A schemes (Scoones et al. ) and before
in the communal areas (Cousins et al. ). Redistributing land unleashes a
set of social, economic and political processes that are complex and intertwined,
and our analysis suggests a number of different trajectories of accumulation,
within and between commercial, aspiring and struggling farmers.
In class terms, we can observe the emergence of a distinct group of capitalist
farmers, perhaps a new rural bourgeoisie, amongst the commercial farmer
group, but linked to quite different underlying drivers. Not all in this group are
so-called ‘cronies’, connected to and dependent on the party-state. Some have
made links with external, global and agribusiness capital to develop partnerships,
while others are accumulating ‘from below’. Aspiring farmers contain a significant
proportion of what we might call ‘petty commodity producers’, combining family-
based production with forms of capitalist production. All aspire to become success-
ful rural capitalists, although many cannot. The final group includes those who,
because of hard times, are operating essentially as peasant producers, but on
often very large land areas. Some have moved into combining limited agricultural
production, with selling labour, merging with the fragmented ‘classes of labour’
(Bernstein ), common amongst both landholders and former farm workers
across the communal and smallholder resettlement areas (Scoones et al. ).
Those whose farms are struggling, but are just holding the land for speculation,
may occupy a variety of class positions, from salaried workers to urban-based capi-
talists to the political-military elite.
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The A areas are therefore a complex socio-political mix. The analyses of
medium-scale farms in Africa that have dominated the literature to date focus
only on size and operated area distributions, together with a limited assessment
of the profiles of farmers. These assessments tell us neither about the social and
political importance of such farms in the wider agrarian setting, nor about the
longer-term consequences of differential accumulation on rural class forma-
tion. Only with a more detailed delving into social, political and economic rela-
tions, as has been attempted here, can we get a sense of what these farms mean
in terms of the wider agrarian political economy. This study suggests therefore a
new avenue for Africa-wide research, going beyond simply describing changes in
farm size structure to understanding the underlying dynamics of on-going agrar-
ian change. For Zimbabwe, our analysis suggests a rejection of the simplistic
assessments that claim the overwhelming dominance of ‘cronies’ or the
writing-off of such areas as wholly unproductive and under-utilised. As our dis-
aggregated analysis shows, there is much more going on both within and across
areas, reflected in very different patterns of accumulation. While the assump-
tion that the A farms would uniformly unleash a new form of commercial agri-
culture in Zimbabwe after land reform has to be significantly tempered, there is
clearly potential. As noted at the beginning of this article, Zimbabwe’s land
reform was a cross-class compromise, with the A farms being part of a political
deal with the professional middle class and the party-military elite. That a diver-
sity of outcomes on these farms has been experienced over nearly  years
should not be a surprise.
The implications for rural politics are not straightforward. If the A ‘commer-
cial farmers’ continue to gain state support and are able to extend processes of
accumulation, they may act to push out the ‘struggling farmers’, who may lease
(or informally sell) land and take up labouring for the larger, more successful
farmers, or move away altogether. Much will hinge on the significant group of
‘aspiring farmers’, whose political connections, and so allegiances, are less
certain. With greater stability in Zimbabwe’s political and economic context,
they may yet emerge as the new drivers of commercialisation, as seen elsewhere
in Africa.
Such a differentiated examination of what people are doing, and the under-
lying trajectories of accumulation, to date largely absent in the wider literature
on medium-scale farms in Africa, suggests diverse implications for policy.
A dominant theme is access to finance and markets, sufficient to allow those
who are aspiring – and often trying under desperate circumstances – to step
up to a more stable, commercial trajectory. The wild fluctuations in macro-eco-
nomic conditions in Zimbabwe, and periodic bouts of extreme economic chaos,
mean that attempts to accumulate are wiped out. A stable, functioning economy
is a basic requirement for any business and, if there is any single policy priority
for the future of medium-scale farms in the post-land reform setting of
Zimbabwe, macro-economic stabilisation must be it. This must come with effect-
ive financing options, including private finance using land leases as collateral, as
well as transparent, accountable, but time-limited and targeted, subsidy policies.
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Lessons from the past are relevant. The emergence of large-scale commercial
agriculture in Zimbabwe during the colonial era and into Independence
occurred through an alliance between white-owned agrarian capital – ranging
from family farmers to large agribusiness concerns – and the state (Scoones
et al. ). This was essential to the political compact that existed through colo-
nial occupation, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence period and that
continued after Independence (Herbst ).
That large areas of potentially productive land are being under-used is clear.
But we also have to recall that extensive use of land for livestock grazing (in
Masvingo-Gutu) and cultivation in patches due to the rocky, mountainous
terrain (in Mvurwi) means that land utilisation figures have to be evaluated
with caution. Equally, it is not as if commercial agriculture in the past always
fully used the land. Indeed, estimates from the s to the s have
shown only –% of land being used in ‘European’ commercial farm
areas, even in the productive Mazowe district (Weiner et al. ).
Nevertheless, land utilisation on the A farms remains a key policy issue.
What, then, is the significance of medium-scale farms for Zimbabwe’s agrarian
future? Compared with the earlier surveys in the mid-s, there was much
more activity in – and, from some farms, a considerable volume of produc-
tion and sale. Sometimes very closely allied with the party-state, sometimes as inde-
pendent or joint-venture arrangements, there is an emergence of a new form of
capitalist, commercial agriculture, and this is especially evident in Mvurwi on the
back of the tobacco boom. Beyond this, there are others who aspire to become
part of a new class of capitalist farmer, but remain severely constrained. The
state’s lack of resources, combined with entrenched corruption and patronage
relations, means that this group is not achieving what it might. But with new
investment, new forms of joint-venture and an injection of flexible finance, the
scope of vibrant commercial agriculture could be expanded. Meanwhile, the
dynamics of what we have termed ‘villagisation’ and investment in ‘projects’
will continue, often linked to diaspora remittance finance.
The now numerous studies of medium-scale farms across Africa have high-
lighted their importance for the future of Africa’s agrarian economies. As this
article shows, the emergence of medium-scale farms in Zimbabwe, in this case
through land reform, is also reshaping the political economy of agrarian
change. We must, however, avoid taking medium-scale farms as a unitary cat-
egory. In Zimbabwe, processes of differentiation are resulting in different trajec-
tories of accumulation and class formation, with commercial, aspiring and
struggling farmers. These differentiated groups have divergent political inter-
ests, with some closely allied with the party-state and reliant on patronage con-
nections for accumulation, while others are ‘accumulating from below’ or not at
all, joining wider, fragmented ‘classes of labour’ in Zimbabwe’s post-land
reform countryside. As the focus for emergent capitalist agriculture and the
location of influential political, military and professional elites, the medium-
scale A farms are thus defining a new politics of commercial agriculture in
Zimbabwe’s countryside following land reform.
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N O T E S
. The land reform of  transferred around . million ha of formerly large-scale commercial
farms and created two major resettlement types: A (smallholder farms, , farms over . million
ha) and A (medium-scale farms, , farms over . million ha) (Moyo : ).
. This literature confusingly shifts definitions between held/controlled land and cultivated/operated
land, ignoring extensive grazing.
. Census: Mvurwi (N=, excluding Forrester; average farm size,  ha, range – ha),
Masvingo-Gutu (N=, average farm size,  ha, range – ha). Average farm sizes derived from
the survey data were:  ha in Mvurwi and  ha in Masvingo-Gutu. The national average A farm size
is  ha, but with a huge range (Moyo : ).
. The short survey had modules on household characteristics (including gender, education, training,
previous occupation, additional residences, posts held); asset ownership (including land, farm equipment,
cattle, housing, transport); crop production (including amounts of crops produced and sold, whether fer-
tiliser applied, access to gardens and irrigation); labour (permanent and temporary, by gender), off-farm
sources of income and patterns of expenditure.
. See Matondi () and Scoones et al. ().
. See: https://zimbabweland.wordpress.com////who-took-the-land-more-on-the-crony-
debate/ (accessed  November ).
. Mrs M, Mvurwi,  September ; also  March  (aspiring farmer, category ).
. Mr M, Gutu,  September  (aspiring farmer, category ).
. Mr C, Mvurwi,  September ; also March  (commercial farmer, category ). The price
of maize was US$/tonne, and chickens sold for around US$.
. Chinese manager, Joint Venture farm, Mvurwi,  November .
. Mr M, Mvurwi,  September  (commercial farmer, category ).
. Mr C, Mvurwi,  September  (aspiring farmer, category ).
. Mr D (worker), Masvingo,  September  (struggling farmer, category ).
. Mrs M, Mvurwi,  September  (struggling farmer, category ).
. https://zimbabweland.wordpress.com////underutilised-land-in-zimbabwe-not-a-new-
problem/ (accessed  October ).
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